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Abstract
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The theoretical model analysis shows how to re-adjust the ﬁrst-best in second-best
situations, in which one of the policy instruments is restricted. Calibrated to the
European power sector, the ﬁrst-best choice of all instruments reduces the climate
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Highlights
• Interacting policy instruments addressing climate change, unanticipated beneﬁts
from R&D and learning as well as insuﬃcient energy eﬃciency investments.
• Policy advice for adjusting available instruments in a second-best world when speciﬁc
instruments are unavailable.
• Theoretical model analysis of the power sector and model calibration to European
data and policy scenarios.
• Feed-in tariﬀs as good substitutes for output subsidies but faint substitutes for R&D
and energy eﬃciency subsidies.
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1

Introduction

Economists tend to give advice under the implicit assumption of the full availability of
ﬁrst-best instruments and institutions. This is of limited use for policy makers since institutions are often imperfect, and speciﬁc policy instruments are often unavailable due
to political constraints, incomplete information or prohibitive transaction and compliance costs (Rodrik, 2008). This is of particular importance in the domain of climate and
energy policy, where multiple market failures need to be corrected with interacting instruments. Typical market failures are (i) the overuse of fossil fuels, (ii) knowledge spillovers of
learning-by-doing of low-carbon technologies, (iii) knowledge spillovers of research and development (R&D), and (iv) imperfect perception of consumers’ beneﬁts of energy eﬃciency
improvements. Such an environment justiﬁes the implementation of four climate and energy policy instruments, one instrument for each market failure (Bennear and Stavins,
2007; Tinbergen, 1952).
Our work focuses on the interaction of these market failures and policy instruments
in a partial equilibrium model of the power sector. It studies how the remaining policy
instruments can be re-adjusted in order to improve welfare, when at least one of the ﬁrstbest optimal instruments is unavailable or restricted. As we will see, it is ex ante not
obvious whether, in which direction and how far the remaining policy instruments should
be re-adjusted. Our analysis sheds light on these interactions and re-adjustments, which
provides guidance for policy makers. So far the literature has not addressed this issue in
this practical energy policy-related form.
In practice, feed-in tariﬀs, which promote electricity generating renewable energy
sources, are a cornerstone of many climate and energy policy portfolios, especially in
Europe. Therefore, our work also studies how far feed-in tariﬀs can replace policy instruments that address the above-mentioned market failures. Our results show that feed-in
tariﬀs are good substitutes for output subsidies that address learning-by-doing, whereas
they are blunt substitutes for subsidies that address R&D or energy eﬃciency.
As we know from general second-best theory, the attainment of Pareto optimal
conditions is no longer necessarily welfare improving if there are political constraints
that prevent the attainment of at least one of the conditions of Pareto optimality
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Thus, if there are multiple market failures, or in general,
economic distortions, that are not remedied by economic policy, then the remedy of one
market failure does not necessarily result in a welfare improvement. It might reduce the
welfare losses created by the other market failures, exacerbate them, or not aﬀect them
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
More speciﬁcally, the literature has shown that pre-existing distortions (caused by
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taxes on capital or labor) create a second-best world, in which Pigouvian taxes are
no longer the ﬁrst-best response to address market failures. Parry et al. (1999) and
Goulder et al. (1999) demonstrate that pre-existing taxes raise the general equilibrium
costs of market-based environmental policies.

Cremer and Gahvari (2001) show how

Pigouvian taxes can be re-adjusted in an economically beneﬁcial way by taking into account the incentives and revenues created by pre-existing taxes.
The research focus of this paper is of particular importance for the European Union
(EU), because the pathway to an energy-eﬃcient, low-carbon economy builds on a portfolio of multiple climate and energy policy instruments that are implemented at diﬀerent
governmental levels. The central instrument for reducing carbon emissions by 20% until
2020 is the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which covers around 45% of the EU’s
greenhouse gas emissions. Around 70% of the emissions in the EU ETS stem from the
stationary power sector. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the power sector. Additional
targets are set for generating 20% of the energy consumed in the EU by 2020 with renewable energy sources and for improving the eﬃciency of energy demand by 20% within the
same time frame. Currently, the proposed framework for 2030 expands these targets to
a 40% reduction in emissions, a 27% renewable energy share, and a 30% improvement in
energy eﬃciency.
As there is no common, transnational instrument to reach the 20% renewable energy
target in the EU, member states make use of country-speciﬁc regulation and policy instruments. Most member states have implemented a kind of feed-in tariﬀ, i.e., renewable
energy-based electricity generators receive a feed-in support payment in addition to their
revenues from selling electricity in the spot market (feed-in premiums) or receive a costbased ﬁxed price when supplying to the grid (feed-in tariﬀ). Part of the attractiveness of
feed-in tariﬀs may be their revenue neutrality rather than their eﬀectiveness.
However, the support of renewable energies and the EU ETS are interdependent. On
the one hand, the pricing of carbon emissions increases the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies, enhances their diﬀusion and fosters learning-by-doing and R&D,
which reduces electricity generation costs. On the other hand, the crowding-out of fossilfuel technologies by renewable energy technologies results in lower carbon emissions. In
the language of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), the two instruments are jointly ameliorating. However, the two instruments can diﬀer regarding their costs and eﬀectiveness, and
they can overlap in a detrimental way. In this sense, they are jointly deteriorating.
Against this background, the literature has critically examined the European climate
and energy policy portfolio. Focusing on the interaction of the EU ETS with renewable
energy support Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010), Böhringer et al. (2008), Böhringer et al.
(2009), Fankhauser et al. (2010), Boeters and Koornneef (2011) and Requate (2015) show
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that overlapping policy instruments can have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on the eﬃciency
and eﬀectiveness of such policy portfolios. Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010) demonstrate
that the additional diﬀusion of renewable energy technologies due to renewable energy
support lowers the price for emissions in the ETS and thus promotes fossil fuel-based
technologies. Such distortions can cause signiﬁcant costs: Boeters and Koornneef (2011)
show that the renewable energy target of the European Union creates excess costs of up to
33% relative to the case with an ETS as the only instrument, depending on the availability
of low cost technologies and the stringency of the renewable energy target. We extend on
this literature by focusing on policy instruments that address technical progress and by
deriving second-best policies.
From a distributional point of view, a combination of policy instruments can have
advantages, since it can balance the cost burden of climate and energy policy among
diﬀerent groups of producers and consumers (Kalkuhl et al., 2013; Hirth and Ueckerdt,
2013). When a knowledge spillover externality exists, a combination of policy instruments is justiﬁed as well. Taking into account knowledge spillovers, Kalkuhl et al. (2012)
ﬁnd that quotas for renewable energy technologies and feed-in tariﬀs are almost as costeﬃcient as ﬁrst-best R&D subsidies. Although renewable energy policies might be good
substitutes for R&D subsidies, they are identiﬁed as poor substitutes for carbon pricing (Kalkuhl et al., 2013). We extend this argument by distinguishing between technical
progress via learning, R&D and investments in energy eﬃciency.
In order to study the ﬁrst- and second-best choice of policy instruments in the power
sector, we build on the model by Fischer and Newell (2008) (hereafter FN) extended by
Fischer et al. (2013) (hereafter FNP). FN and FNP calibrate their model to the power
sector of the United States of America (USA) and compare the welfare eﬀects of policy
instruments that are relevant for the USA. The following paper provides new insights
and novel results by analyzing the second-best re-adjustments of policy instruments, by
introducing feed-in tariﬀs and by calibrating the model to EU data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the model is set up and solved analytically.
Based on this model, second-best policy portfolios are theoretically discussed in Section
3. Section 4 presents the numerical implementation of the model and its calibration
to the EU power sector. It compares the qualitative insights of the previous section to
quantitative results for the EU and discusses them critically. Section 5 concludes by
formulating policy implications.
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2

Model setup and solution

This section describes and solves a two-period partial equilibrium model of the electricity
market that will be used for our policy analysis. The model closely follows FN and FNP.
The model setup is, however, rewritten in a more general manner. For a more detailed
and more speciﬁc description, the reader may refer to the original sources. The model
focuses on those features that are necessary for the inspection of multiple interacting
market failures and corresponding policy instruments in a ﬁrst- and second-best world.
Compared to FN, the model extension by FNP includes investments in energy eﬃciency
by consumers, which we also feature in our new model version. First, a non-technical
overview of the model features is given, followed by a mathematical description of the key
equations of the model. Second, the model is solved by deriving optimality conditions.

2.1

Non-technical overview

Electricity can be generated with renewable and fossil fuel-based technologies. Both are
subject to convex increasing production costs. Our analysis focuses on immature renewable energy technologies that are subject to cost reductions from R&D eﬀorts and
learning-by-doing. Today’s R&D creates knowledge that helps to reduce future production
costs. Today’s accumulation of experience, represented by the total volume of electricity
generation, reduces future production costs as well. The utilization of a technology is governed by a price-taking representative producer that maximizes proﬁts, i.e., revenues from
electricity generation minus production costs, R&D expenditures, and costs of regulation.
Electricity is demanded by a representative consumer who draws utility from its consumption. Besides spending her income on electricity, she can invest in three types of energy eﬃciency measures that take eﬀect either in the short-term (within the ﬁrst period),
in the long-term (within the second period), or both (across both periods). Examples are
the replacement of old refrigerators by modern ones or the improvement of house insulation
in combination with modern electrical heating. The energy eﬃciency measures reduce the
required electricity expenditures for a given level of utility drawn from consumption. The
representative consumer maximizes utility, i.e., the value of consumed electricity services
minus the costs of electricity required to generate these services minus expenditures on
energy eﬃciency improvements. We discount the future in order to obtain the net present
value of electricity services and costs.
Our model considers four market failures. Each can be corrected with a speciﬁc corresponding instrument. First, without regulation, carbon emissions are above their socially
optimal level. However, climate change impacts are not modeled. We assume that an
emissions trading system (ETS) with an emissions target, given by an exogenous policy
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decision, is imposed in order to reduce CO2 emissions from electricity generation. As
such, even if the resulting permit price is below the social cost of carbon, overlapping
policies will not aﬀect overall emissions. This makes welfare comparable across policy
scenarios, while ignoring future climate change impacts. This implies that we carry out a
cost-eﬀectiveness analysis with respect to a given emissions target. As a consequence, we
rule out the re-adjustment of support for renewable energies or energy eﬃciency improvements as a reaction to an emissions target that may be suboptimal from a social point of
view.
Second, electricity producers using immature renewable energy technologies do not
perceive and internalize the full beneﬁt of productivity gains through learning-by-doing.
Although we do not explicitly model technology spillovers across producers (following FN’s
model), we suppose that a knowledge externality exists that renewable energy producers
ignore. Consequently, without policy intervention renewable energy production is lower
than socially optimal. Thus, an output subsidy can be granted to correct for this market
failure.
Third, in the same way, electricity producers using immature renewable energy technologies perceive and internalize only a fraction of the beneﬁts from their R&D eﬀorts due
to knowledge spillovers. Since producers do not take the full social beneﬁt of their R&D
investments into account, R&D investments are below the socially optimal level. Thus,
an R&D subsidy for renewable energy producers can be granted in order to raise R&D
investments and their social beneﬁts.
Fourth, the consumer perceives only a fraction of the beneﬁts of her investments in
energy eﬃciency. As a consequence, she underinvests in energy eﬃciency measures in
the short- and long-term, and electricity demand is above its socially optimal level. To
address this market failure, speciﬁc subsidies can be granted to encourage investments in
three diﬀerent types of energy eﬃciency measures (short-, long-term and both).

2.2

Mathematical representation

This subsection depicts and explains the key model equations.

7

2.2.1

Electricity generation

Each representative electricity producer using technology i maximizes proﬁts according to
the following expression:
max{qi1 ,qi2 ,hi1 } Πi ,
Πi = n1 [(p1 + φi1 )q i1 − C i1 (q i1 ) − τ 1 µi q i1 − (1 − σ i1 )Ri1 (hi1 )]

(1)

+δn2 [(p2 + φi2 )q i2 − C i2 (q i2 | ρn1 q i1 , ρn1 hi1 ) − τ 2 µi q i2 ]
The indices 1 and 2 indicate the ﬁrst and second model period t = {1; 2}. n is the
number of years subsumed in each period. Second-period values are discounted by the
factor 0 < δ < 1. pt signiﬁes the equilibrium electricity price in period t. φit denotes a
technology-speciﬁc net subsidy that the regulator may distribute per unit of production.
Accordingly, a negative value of φit denotes a net tax. q it is the quantity of electricity
produced with technology i in period t. q i1 and q i2 are producers’ two basic control
variables.
Carbon emissions intensity µi is technology-speciﬁc, but time-invariant. Renewable
energy technologies and nuclear power are assumed to have a carbon intensity of zero,
whereas fossil fuel technologies have positive carbon intensities. Total emissions stemming from a fossil fuel technology i in period t are expressed as nt µi q it .

τ t is the

period-dependent price for one unit of carbon emissions. When restricting emissions by
a binding cumulative emissions cap ξ, the carbon price will emerge endogenously so that
P P
ξ ≥ t i (nt µi q it + ǫt ) holds. ǫt denotes non-electricity emissions that are not explicitly

modeled but captured by climate policy.1

We pay special attention to the representation of production costs. C it is the corresponding technology- and period-speciﬁc cost function with the properties Cqitit > 0 and
Cqitit qit > 0. Throughout the paper, a lower index denotes a derivative with respect to this
variable. This implies that production costs are convex in output. We assume, however,
that it is possible for immature renewable energy technologies to decrease their production costs through learning-by-doing and R&D investments. Let us therefore focus on
immature renewable and carbon-free energy technologies i ∈ r. r denotes a subset of
all technologies. The technologies subsumed in r are subject to cost-reducing technical
progress, such as wind or solar power. Other carbon-free technologies, like nuclear power
and hydro power as well as fossil fuel technologies, are treated as mature technologies
without further cost reduction potential.
1
We keep ǫt constant at ǫt = ǭt in the theoretical analysis, whereas we will model it explicitly in the
numerical analysis.

8

The ﬁrst mechanism to reduce production costs of immature renewable energy technologies r is the accumulation of knowledge via R&D. First-period technology-speciﬁc
R&D adds new knowledge hi1 to the knowledge stock H i0 existing in period 1. Hence, hi1
is the third control variable for producers using immature renewable energy technologies.
The resulting equation of motion reads H i2 = H i0 + n1 hi1 . The fruits of R&D become
eﬀective in the second period. This means ﬁrst-period knowledge hi1 eventually results in
lower second-period production costs C i2 ∀ i ∈ r, but has no impact on C i2 ∀ i ∈
/ r. R&D
expenditures Ri1 (hi1 ) are convex in the creation of new knowledge:
Ri1 (hi1 ), Rhi1i1 > 0, Rhi1i1 hi1 > 0

(2)

Notably, only the fraction ρ of knowledge hi1 generates private beneﬁts from R&D for a
speciﬁc producer in period 2. Hence, ρ = 1 characterizes the case of full private beneﬁts
from R&D, whereas ρ = 0 reﬂects the extreme case of no private beneﬁts. A lower ρ results
in lower private R&D investment and consequently in suboptimal knowledge creation from
a social point of view. To address underinvestment in R&D, policy makers can introduce
a technology-speciﬁc subsidy σ i1 for R&D expenditures.
The second mechanism that helps to drive down costs of immature renewable energy technologies r is the accumulation of experience via learning-by-doing. First-period
technology-speciﬁc electricity output q i1 adds new experience to the stock of past experience Qi0 . The resulting equation of motion reads Qi2 = Qi0 + n1 q i1 . We presume that
Qi2 reduces C i2 ∀ i ∈ r, whereas it does not have an eﬀect on C i2 ∀ i ∈
/ r. As in the case
of R&D, only the fraction ρ represents private beneﬁts from learning. Again, if ρ < 1,
producers are not able to fully beneﬁt from their eﬀorts and thus extend capacities below
the social optimum. In order to correct this market failure, policy makers can incentivize
the expansion of quantities with the net subsidy φit per unit of output.
We combine the two mechanisms in a two-factor learning curve. Since H i2 and hi1
diﬀer only by the constant H i0 and the factor n1 , we can replace H i2 by hi1 with respect to
qualitative marginal eﬀects. The same argument applies to Qi2 and q i1 . Based on these
considerations, we assume that the following relations hold for all immature renewable
energy technologies i ∈ r in period 2:
C i2 (q i2 | n1 q i1 , ρn1 hi1 ),
Cqi2i2 > 0, Cqi2i2 qi2 > 0,
Cqi2i1 < 0, Cqi2i1 qi1 > 0, Chi2i1 < 0, Chi2i1 hi1 > 0,
Cqi2i2 hi1 = Chi2i1 qi2 < 0, Cqi2i1 qi2 = Cqi2i2 qi1 < 0, Cqi2i1 hi1 = Chi2i1 qi1 > 0
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(3)

Since we carry out a partial equilibrium analysis, other costs not captured by the power
sector, such as opportunity costs and crowding out of other investments by energy-speciﬁc
R&D investment, are implicitly subsumed in this cost function. The ﬁrst line describes
that second-period production costs are a function of second-period electricity output as
well as ﬁrst-period electricity output and new knowledge created via R&D. The second
line posits that the production costs increase in second-period output in a convex fashion.
The third line, on the contrary, posits that higher ﬁrst-period output reduces secondperiod production costs, yet with a decreasing marginal eﬀect. It assumes the same
eﬀect on production costs for knowledge created in the ﬁrst period. The fourth line
deals with cross-dependencies of variables. Accordingly, higher ﬁrst-period output reduces
the marginal cost of second-period production. Higher ﬁrst-period knowledge reduces
the marginal cost of second-period production as well. The last expression states that
experience (learning-by-doing) and knowledge (R&D) act as substitutes: If learning has
already reduced production costs, there will be less scope for further cost reductions via
R&D. Likewise, when R&D has already driven down production costs, there will be less
scope for learning.
2.2.2

Electricity demand

The deﬁnition of the consumer side, described by this subsection in compact form, is based
on FNP, too. The consumer can invest in two short-term and one long-term type of energy
eﬃciency measures: A higher eS1 reduces ﬁrst-period electricity demand d1 , whereas
eS2 reduces second-period electricity demand d2 . These are short-term energy eﬃciency
measures indicated by the index S. eL1 represents long-term energy eﬃciency measures
symbolized by the upper index L1: The investment takes place in the ﬁrst period, while
it increases energy eﬃciency in both periods. These energy eﬃciency measures are the
three control variables of the consumer, and each measure is subject to convex investment
costs:
S1
Z S1 (eS1 ), ZeS1
S1 > 0, ZeS1 eS1 > 0

(4)

S2
Z S2 (eS2 ), ZeS2
S2 > 0, ZeS2 eS2 > 0
L1
Z L1 (eL1 ), ZeL1
L1 > 0, ZeL1 eL1 > 0

A demand-side market failure is reﬂected in that, when the consumer makes her energy
eﬃciency investments, she perceives only the fraction β S1 , β S2 and β L1 , respectively, of the
full energy savings. β = 1 characterizes the case of full valuation, whereas β = 0 reﬂects
the extreme case of no valuation. Since undervaluation of energy eﬃciency beneﬁts causes
a sub-optimal investment, a subsidy λ, which deducts a fraction of the investment costs,
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can be granted for each type of energy eﬃciency improvement.
Even though the consumer may undervalue the energy savings of investments, once
investments are made, the full savings accrue to the consumer. Thus, the undervaluation
parameters will reveal themselves in the ﬁrst-order conditions for the consumer, but not
in the welfare evaluation.
The representative consumer maximizes money-metric utility according to the following expression (in this partial equilibrium analysis abstracting from consumption of other
goods):
max{v1 ,v2 ,eS1 ,eL1 ,eS2} U,
U =n


1


v 1 − p1 d1 (v 1 , eS1 , eL1 ) − (1 − λS1 )Z S1 (eS1 | β S1 ) − (1 − λL1 )Z L1 (eL1 | β L1 )


−δn2 v 2 − p2 d2 (v 2 , eS2 , eL1 ) − (1 − λS2 )Z S2 (eS2 | β S2 )
(5)

v t denotes the value of electricity services for the consumer. On the one hand, higher
consumption of electricity services results in higher electricity demand dt , valued at the
current electricity price pt . On the other hand, the consumer can reduce electricity demand, required to achieve a certain level of electricity services, via one of the three energy
eﬃciency measures introduced above, here for simplicity denoted by e(S/L)t :
dtvt > 0, dte(S/L)t < 0, dtvt e(S/L)t = dte(S/L)t vt < 0

(6)

Energy eﬃciency measures also mitigate the increase in energy demand at the margin as
expressed by the cross derivatives. To close the model, it must hold that total electricity
supply satisﬁes electricity demand dt in each period:
i
X

q it ≥ dt

(7)

The full representation of the model with speciﬁc functional forms used for the numerical
analysis is spelled out by FNP.

2.3

Solving the model

We solve the model by deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problems
described in Equations (1) and (5). We obtain the following ﬁrst-order conditions derived
from

∂Πi
∂q i1

=

∂Πi
∂q i2

=

∂Πi
∂hi1

=

∂U
∂v1

=

∂U
∂v2

=

∂U
∂eS1
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=

∂U
∂eS2

=

∂U
∂eL1

= 0 that characterize the

equilibrium (see FN and FNP):
−ρδn2 Cqi2i1 + p1 + φi1 = Cqi1i1 + µi τ 1

(8)

p2 + φi2 = Cqi2i2 + µi τ 2

(9)

−ρδn2 Chi2i1 (1 − σ)−1 = Rhi1

−β L1 n1 p1 d1eL1

(10)

(d1v1 )−1 = p1

(11)

(d2v2 )−1 = p2

(12)

−β S1 n1 p1 d1eS1 (1 − λS1 )−1 = ZeS1
S1

(13)

−β S2 δn2 p2 d2eS2 (1 − λS2 )−1 = ZeS2
S2

− β L1 δn2 p2 d2eL1 (1 − λL1 )−1 = ZeL1
L1

(14)
(15)

In the equations above, lower indices denote derivatives as usual. The left-hand side of
each equation depicts marginal beneﬁts, whereas the right-hand side depicts marginal
costs. In equilibrium, marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs are equalized. Note that
several derivatives appearing on the left-hand side are negative so that the terms on the
left-hand side of all equations are positive. On the demand side (Equations 11 and 12)
marginal utility is expressed as the inverse of the derivative of electricity demand with
respect to utility. Also note that Cqi2i1 is positive for immature renewable technologies
i ∈ r, but zero for other technologies i ∈
/ r. On the contrary, µi is zero for all i ∈ r,
but non-negative for other technologies i ∈
/ r. Equation (10) is only deﬁned for immature
renewables i ∈ r, because other technologies are not subject to R&D.

3

Theoretical policy analysis

This section derives the ﬁrst-best set of policy instruments along the lines of FN and FNP.
It then carries out a novel algebraic second-best policy analysis.

3.1

First-best policy portfolio

The ﬁrst-best policy response to the respective externalities is the full internalization of
these externalities. Hence, we assume that the full social beneﬁts of R&D and of learningby-doing including their spillovers are taken into account by private investors so that ρ = 1.
Furthermore, we assume that the consumer perceives the full beneﬁt of her investments
in energy eﬃciency so that β S1 = β S2 = β L1 = 1 . All remaining policy instruments
are set to zero, i.e., φi1 = φi2 = λS1 = λS2 = λL1 = 0. Carbon prices can be given by
τ 1 = τ̄ 1 and τ 2 = τ̄ 2 in the benchmark situation. If a cumulative emissions target over
both periods is given in policy scenarios, carbon prices will adjust endogenously such that
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τ 1 = δτ 2 holds, taking discounting with the factor 0 < δ < 1 into account. Accordingly,
the optimal carbon price rises over time.
Inserting these parameter choices into (8) to (15) yields the ﬁrst-best optimal conditions (8)’ to (15)’. We can now derive the choice of the policy instruments φi1 , φi2 , λS1 ,
λS2 and λL1 such that (8) to (15) are equivalent to (8)’ to (15)’. In this way, we obtain
the set of ﬁrst-best policy instrument choices (see FN and FNP):
τ 1 = τ̄ 1 = δτ 2

(16)

φi1 = −(1 − ρ)δn2 Cqi2i1 , φi2 = 0 ∀ i ∈ r
σ = 1−ρ

(17)
(18)

λS1 = 1 − β S1 , λS2 = 1 − β S2 , λL1 = 1 − β L1

(19)

The policy instruments in the four equations correct the four market failures. The ﬁrst
equation describes how carbon pricing internalizes the social costs of carbon, or, rather,
the costs of meeting the emissions target that is exogenously given by a policy decision.
Carbon prices are allowed to ﬂoat endogenously in the policy scenarios. The second
equation describes how an output subsidy for immature renewable technologies internalizes
the social beneﬁt of learning-by-doing, which is not taken into account by decentralized
renewable energy producers. The second-period output subsidy is zero, because secondperiod production has no impact on future costs beyond the model horizon. In the third
equation, an R&D subsidy internalizes the social beneﬁt of R&D. In the fourth equation,
subsidies for energy eﬃciency investments internalize non-perceived beneﬁts by the three
types of energy eﬃciency improvements. In the absence of other market failures, there
is no economic reason to impose further policy instruments, so that φi1 = 0 ∀ i ∈
/ r and
φi2 = 0 ∀ i is the ﬁrst-best choice.

3.2

Second-best policy portfolios

If now, either due to political constraints or because transaction and enforcement costs
are too high, one or more of the described market failures cannot be remedied with their
ﬁrst-best policy responses, the remaining policy instruments need to be adjusted in order
to be welfare maximizing. This means that a change in one of the instruments described
by Equations (16) to (19) calls for an adjustment of the remaining instruments. If, for
example, the R&D subsidy is not available, the welfare maximizing choice of the renewable
energy output subsidy and the energy eﬃciency subsidies will in general deviate from the
ﬁrst-best choice. Yet there is no general theory that tells us how the second-best solution
looks compared to the ﬁrst-best solution.
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3.2.1

Welfare effects

First and foremost, it is helpful to write down the change in economic surplus for any
policy intervention as derived in detail by FNP. Total economic surplus is the sum of
producer and consumer surplus and hence obtained by combining Equations (1) and (5):
W = n1 [v 1 − Z S1 (eS1 ) − Z L1 (eL1 ) −

X

C i1 (q i1 ) −

i

2

2

+ δn [v − Z

S2

S2

(e ) −

X

i2

X

Ri1 (hi1 )]

i∈r

(20)

i2

C (q )]

i

The consumer’s electricity bill paid to electricity producers drops out as a pure transfer,
P
since pt dt = pt i q it . By the same token, tax and subsidy payments are pure transfers

between consumers and producers and drop out. We aim at an expression for the change

in economic surplus due to the change in a policy intervention Ψ, given the choice of other
policy interventions. We obtain this expression following FNP by totally diﬀerentiating
the above expression for the economic surplus, inserting the previously derived ﬁrst-order
conditions and postulating that total electricity demand equals supply.
i dq i1
Xh
dW
−Cqi2i1 δn2 (1 − ρ) − φi1
= n1
dΨ
dΨ
i∈r

+ n1

X

(−Chi2i1 )δn2

i∈r

1 − ρ − σ dhi1
1 − σ dΨ


1 − β S1 − λS1 deS1 1 − β L1 − λL1 deL1
+n p d
+
1 − λS1
dΨ
1 − λL1
dΨ


S2
L1
L1
S2
S2
1 − β − λ deL1
− λ de
2 2 2 1−β
+
+ δn p d
1 − λS2
dΨ
1 − λL1
dΨ
i1
i2
X
X
dq
dq
τ 1 µi
+ n1
τ 2 µi
+ δn2
dΨ
dΨ
1 1 1

i

+ n1

X
i∈r
/



(21)

i

X
dq i2
dq i1
(−φi2 )
(−φi1 )
+ δn2
dΨ
dΨ
i

This expression takes into account that total cumulative emissions are kept constant. Each
line in the above equation expresses that an increase in the associated variable will create
a positive welfare change as long as the marginal costs of the imposed policy instrument
are smaller than the corresponding marginal social beneﬁt—that is, as long as its market
failure is under-internalized. (Note that Cqi2i1 < 0 and Chi2i1 < 0.) The ﬁrst line refers
to the output subsidy for immature renewable technologies, the second line to the R&D
subsidy, the third and fourth line to the subsidies for the three types of energy eﬃciency
investments. Inserting the optimal choices of policy instruments according to Equations
(17) to (19) results in a zero welfare change. This implies that we measure welfare changes
relative to the ﬁrst-best welfare maximum, which cannot be exceeded. The ﬁfth line refers
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to carbon pricing. On the one hand, carbon pricing creates a positive welfare eﬀect via
tax revenues or revenues from auctioning oﬀ allowances. On the other hand, it reduces
it

the output of the producers aﬀected by carbon pricing ( dq
dΨ < 0). As a result, it creates a
negative welfare eﬀect. Optimal carbon pricing, however, does not create a welfare eﬀect:
P
P
According to (16), it is in this case τ 1 = τ̄ 1 = δτ 2 and n1 i µi dq i1 = n2 i µi dq i2 so that

the ﬁfth line drops out (see FNP). The last line refers to ﬁrst-period net subsidies for technologies other than mature renewables and second-period net subsidies for any technology.

A net tax (−φit ) creates a revenue but reduces output and creates a distortion so that
the overall welfare eﬀect is negative. A net subsidy (+φit ) augments output but requires
a payment to producers. This means as long as all policy instruments discussed above are
set to their optimal values, any additional policy intervention will be distortionary and
result in a welfare loss. Hence, the ﬁrst-best choice is φi1 = 0 ∀ i ∈
/ r and φi2 = 0 ∀ i.
3.2.2

Re-adjustment of policy instruments

In the following, our research goes beyond FN and FNP by addressing this research
question: Suppose one of the ﬁrst-best instruments is unavailable; how does this aﬀect
the welfare maximizing second-best adjustment of other policy instruments? The choice
of the policy instruments and the direction of re-adjustment always refer to the way in
which they are introduced in the model setup and appear in the optimality conditions
in Equations (8) to (15). The emissions target is exogenously given and kept constant
throughout the paper so that the scenario results are comparable given a speciﬁc state of
the environment. Throughout this section, the remaining policy instruments that are not
under scrutiny are kept constant at their ﬁrst-best optimal levels so that we can focus on
the second-best re-adjustment of one policy instrument in each step. (This assumption
will be relaxed in the numerical analysis.) Detailed proofs, explanations and discussions
of the propositions can be found in the Appendix.
(a) Output (learning) subsidies for immature renewable technologies
We have derived the ﬁrst-best choice of the ﬁrst- and second-period output subsidies
for the case that all market failures are remedied as φi1 = −(1 − ρ)δn2 Cqi2i1 , φi2 = 0, see
Equation (17).
(aa) Now we suppose that the R&D subsidy σ is not (suﬃciently) available as a policy
instrument so that it is set below its ﬁrst-best value, in the extreme case σ = 0.
Proposition 1. A below-optimal R&D subsidy requires ceteris paribus a lower output
(learning) subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies in the short-term and a
higher output subsidy in the long-term in the second-best compared to the first-best in
order to raise welfare.
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The proof with explanations and discussions can be found in the Appendix. It is
important to note that we treat learning and R&D as substitutes and that we assume
R&D improves existing technologies rather than creating new technologies. A change in
these assumptions can result in the opposite relation between R&D and output (learning)
subsidies. In the Appendix we also argue that the below-optimal R&D subsidy is expected
to raise the second-period electricity and carbon prices.
(ab) Now we suppose that energy eﬃciency subsidies λt are not (suﬃciently) available
as policy instruments so that in the extreme case λS1 = λS2 = λL1 = 0. Let us deﬁne the
price elasticity of electricity demand as

∆dt /dt
∆pt /pt .

The emissions target is exogenously given.

The remaining policy instruments are again kept constant.
Proposition 2. Below-optimal energy efficiency subsidies require ceteris paribus a higher
(lower) output subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies in the short- and longterm in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise welfare if the price
elasticity of electricity demand is above (below) unity.
For a more detailed argument see the Appendix. The lack of subsidies for energy
eﬃciency investment is expected to raise the electricity and carbon prices in both periods
due to the expansion of electricity demand.
(b) R&D subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies
We have derived the ﬁrst-best choice of the R&D subsidy for the case that all market
failures are remedied as σ = 1 − ρ, see Equation (18). Note that we have deﬁned (1 −
σ i1 ) · Ri1 (hi1 ) in multiplicative form in Equation (1). By expanding this term, we obtain
Ri1 (hi1 ) − σ i1 Ri1 (hi1 ) in additive form. If σ i1 is kept constant, but Ri1 (hi1 ) changes, then
the term σ i1 Ri1 (hi1 ) will nevertheless change as well. This means that higher (lower)
R&D expenditures are accompanied by a higher (lower) R&D subsidy in absolute terms
even though the factor σ i1 may be kept constant.
(ba) We suppose that the ﬁrst-period subsidy φi1 for immature renewable technologies
is not (suﬃciently) available, so that a suboptimal situation occurs, in which in the extreme
case φit = 0. The emissions target and the remaining policy instruments are constant as
before.
Proposition 3. A below-optimal output (learning) subsidy requires ceteris paribus a
higher (lower) R&D subsidy in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise
welfare if the output increase via R&D is larger (smaller) than the replacement of learning
by R&D.
Due to the limited support for (renewable) electricity generation, the electricity and
the carbon price are expected to increase in both periods.
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(bb) Let us assume once again that the three types of energy eﬃciency subsidies λ are
not (suﬃciently) available as policy instruments so that in the extreme case λS1 = λS2 =
λL1 = 0. The emissions target and the remaining policy instruments are kept constant.
Proposition 4. Below-optimal energy efficiency subsidies require ceteris paribus a higher
(lower) R&D subsidy in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise welfare
if the price elasticity of electricity demand is above (below) unity.
In this paragraph and in the following paragraphs, the interaction of climate and
energy policy is analogous to the considerations above.
(c) Energy efficiency subsidies for consumers
In the ﬁrst-best, the energy eﬃciency subsidies fully oﬀset the three types of consumer
undervaluation: λS1 = 1 − β S1 , λS2 = 1 − β S2 , λL1 = 1 − β L1 , see (19). Note that the
same considerations for subsidies deﬁned in multiplicative or in additive form apply as for
R&D subsidies in paragraph (b) above.
(ca) We assume that the R&D subsidy σ is not (suﬃciently) available as a policy
instrument so that in the extreme case σ = 0. As before we make the assumption that
the emissions target and the remaining policy instruments are given.
Proposition 5. A below-optimal R&D subsidy suggests ceteris paribus a higher subsidy
for energy efficiency investment affecting the short-term2 and lower energy efficiency subsidies affecting the long-term in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise
welfare.
(cb) We suppose that the ﬁrst-period subsidy φi1 for immature renewable energy
technologies is not (suﬃciently) available as a policy instrument so that in the extreme
case φit = 0. As before we make the assumption that the emissions target and the
remaining policy instruments are given.
Proposition 6. A below-optimal output (learning) subsidy for immature renewable energy
technologies requires ceteris paribus lower energy efficiency subsidies affecting the shortand long-term in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise welfare.
(d) Feed-in policies as feasible instruments
The discussed policy instruments, although adjusted in a second-best world, all aim at
a speciﬁc externality. In reality, however, policy makers often make use of so-called feed-in
policies, i.e., renewable electricity generators receive a feed-in support payment in addition
to their revenues from selling electricity in the spot market (“feed-in premium”) or receive
2

Short-term refers to model period 1, whereas long-term refers to model period 2.
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a cost-based ﬁxed price when supplied to the grid (“feed-in tariﬀ”). The main goal of such
a feed-in support scheme is to foster the diﬀusion of renewable energy technologies and
thus, through learning-by-doing, bring down generation costs. The resources to ﬁnance
such a scheme can be raised either by taxing consumers, as is the case in Germany, or
by taxing non-renewable energy producers, as is assumed in the model by Kalkuhl et al.
(2013). In the following, we will examine how such feed-in systems can substitute optimal
policy instruments.
We build this analysis on paragraph (a) about output subsidies. Nonetheless, the
combination of the subsidy with the levy on producers of fossil shifts electricity generation
from carbon-emitting to non-emitting technologies. This creates an additional lever to
address the undervaluation of investments in R&D and energy eﬃciency. On the contrary,
the tax has a distortionary eﬀect with negative consequences for welfare. Let us ﬁrst
formulate a general proposition about feed-in tariﬀs. Therein, the emissions target is
exogenously given, the subsidy for renewable energy output is accompanied by a tax on
emitting technologies, and the remaining policy instruments are set to their ﬁrst-best
levels.
Proposition 7. If the output subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies is accompanied by an output tax on the remaining (emitting) technologies, ceteris paribus the
subsidy must be lower in the second-best compared to the first-best in order to raise welfare.
The adjustment of the subsidy refers to its policy level as described by Equations (8)
and (9). The economic intuition is straightforward: The tax on the remaining technologies
shifts production from these technologies to immature renewable energy technologies so
that their output increases. This means the tax takes over part of the impact of the
subsidy. 
The second-best policy analysis replicates the previous second-best analysis, but makes
use of renewable energy output subsidies.
(da) We assume that the R&D subsidy σ is not (suﬃciently) available as a policy
instrument so that in the extreme case σ = 0. The emissions target is exogenously given
as before, the subsidy for renewable energy output is accompanied by a tax on emitting
technologies, and the remaining policy instruments are kept constant at their ﬁrst-best
levels.
Proposition 8. A below-optimal R&D subsidy requires ceteris paribus a lower feed-in
tariff rate in the short-term and a higher feed-in tariff in the long-term in the second-best
in order to raise welfare.
In this case, the reasoning explained in the appendix follows Proposition 1.
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(db) Let us ﬁnally suppose that energy eﬃciency subsidies λt are not (suﬃciently)
available as policy instruments so that in the extreme case λS1 = λS2 = λL1 = 0. The
subsidy for renewable energy output is accompanied by a tax on emitting technologies,
while the assumptions on the emissions target and the remaining policy instruments are
chosen as in the previous analyses.
Proposition 9. Below-optimal energy efficiency subsidies require ceteris paribus a higher
(lower) feed-in tariff in the short- and long-term in order to improve welfare in the secondbest if the price elasticity of electricity demand is above (below) unity.
In this case, the reasoning is more complex than for Proposition 2, because the tax
and the subsidy work in opposite directions with respect to the quantity of generated
electricity. The overall eﬀect depends on whether the subsidy or the tax dominates the
overall reaction of electricity generation and pricing. One can expect that the eﬀect of
the subsidy dominates, because the subsidy is granted for renewable energy technologies
with learning potential, whereas the conventional technologies aﬀected by the tax do not
involve learning, nor other externalities, so that the eﬀect of the tax is weaker. We end
up with a result that mimics Proposition 2.
The feed-in tariﬀ scenarios in general result in increased electricity prices, because
the electricity tax comes on top of the electricity price. With respect to the interaction
of climate and energy policy, the introduction of taxes on non-renewable energies additionally shifts electricity generation from fossil to carbon-free technologies. This shift
reduces the CO2 price. The non-availability of R&D subsidies, however, reduces renewable
energy-based electricity generation, and the non-availability of energy eﬃciency subsidies
increases electricity demand. Both eﬀects oppose the reduction of the CO2 price.

4

Applied policy scenario analysis

As shown by the theoretical considerations of second-best policy design in the previous
section, the exact design of policy instruments often depends on the dominance of opposing eﬀects. Thus, a numerical implementation of the model is needed in order to (i)
quantify the opposing eﬀects and (ii) check which eﬀect dominates and in which direction
the total eﬀect ﬁnally points. Furthermore, as an example for an instrument that is often used in European countries, we analyze feed-in policies in more detail. We do so by
calibrating the model to data for the EU. In the theoretical considerations in Section 3.2
we studied the impact of one below-optimal or non-available policy instrument on each
other instrument separately (for reasons of mathematical tractability). In this section,
we study for each scenario the impact of one non-available policy instrument on all remaining instruments. We describe the model calibration and then deﬁne the scenarios to
19

Figure 1: Electricity mix in scenario with CO2 pricing for the EU in 2020 (the ﬁrst model
period) referring to the electricity output in the Baseline scenario by Capros et al. (2009).

be examined numerically. This will allow us to identify possible interactions between the
adjustments of the second-best instruments.

4.1

Model calibration

The model characteristics, the speciﬁc functional forms and the parameter values are
taken from FNP if not explicitly mentioned otherwise. Hence, the reader may refer to
FNP for more details. The main diﬀerence is the calibration of the model to the European
electricity market. This subsection gives a narrative overview of the choice of speciﬁc
functional forms and their calibration to European data.
For the two stages, we assume that the short-term, period 1, runs from 2016 to 2020
and the long-term, period 2, runs from 2021 to 2040. Our calibrated model distinguishes
among seven diﬀerent power generation technologies: The carbon emitting technologies,
coal (including lignite), gas, and oil. Solar (including further new renewable energies,
such as tidal power, geothermal, etc.) and wind are assumed to be immature carbonfree technologies that are subject to cost reductions through learning-by-doing and R&D
investments. For the remaining technologies, hydro and nuclear, we assume that their
quantities are ﬁxed or can be adjusted in the second period, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the EU electricity mix in a scenario with CO2 pricing for the year 2020.
The cost function for each power generation technology is assumed to increase in
the generated quantity in a quadratic fashion. Consequently, the ﬁrst-order derivative
describing marginal costs is increasing linearly in quantity, meaning that the resulting
supply schedule of each technology is linear over the explored policy space. The slopes of
the supply curves are calibrated by comparing source-speciﬁc eﬀective prices for electric20

ity generation and their respective quantities from scenarios in the 2009 Energy Trends
published by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy (Capros et al.,
2009, p. 67). The Energy Trends describe two main scenarios. The Baseline scenario
projects the development of the EU energy system under policies as of April 2009, which
includes the ETS, while the Reference scenario includes the mandatory emission and energy targets for 2020 adopted subsequently. Both scenarios under comparison refer to an
EU climate policy with a CO2 emissions reduction of about 20% by 2030 compared to
2005. We draw upon the CO2 and electricity prices as well as the shadow value of renewable energy in order to calculate the net producer price for each electricity technology.
For example, the CO2 price in the Baseline is 25 e’08/t for 2020 and 39 e’08/t in 2030;
in Reference it is 16.5 e’08/t in 2020 and 18.7 e’08/t in 2030, and the average shadow
value for renewable energy is 49.5 e’08/MWh in 2020 and 34.8 e’08/MWh in 2030. We
adjust our benchmark calibration to these scenarios and ﬁx the corresponding emissions
across all scenarios. In the policy scenarios, however, CO2 prices can freely adjust, given
a cumulative emissions target derived from these scenarios.
To calculate the carbon cost burden for fossil sources, we compute the emissions intensity of each technology from the data as well. Together with the electricity prices, this
information allows us to calibrate supply curves for each source.
For the renewable energy technologies, we take into account that the incentives for
engaging in learning-by-doing must be incorporated into the calculation of the supply
curves in the ﬁrst stage to ensure that the ﬁrst-order conditions hold. Cost reductions
via learning and R&D are modeled as a two-factor learning curve in the form of a CobbDouglas function with negative exponents (that need not add up to one). The rate of
private knowledge beneﬁts is set to one half, i.e., ρ = 0.5 for both R&D and learning.
Baseline R&D spending and other knowledge and investment cost parameters follow FNP.
The fraction of the beneﬁt of energy eﬃciency improvements that the consumer perceives is set to 80%, i.e., β = 0.8. The reduction of electricity demand through investments
in energy eﬃciency is modeled in the form of an exponential function with endogenous
investments with a negative sign in the exponent. The representative consumer’s utility
rises in the consumption of electricity services.
We focus on the power sector, but since the existing EU ETS also includes additional
sectors beyond the power sector, we take emissions abatement opportunities in these
sectors into account as well to compute the CO2 price eﬀects of overlapping policies. To
this end, the slope of the marginal costs of emissions reductions in the non-power sector
is computed similarly by calculating the diﬀerence in the CO2 prices between the two
scenarios divided by the diﬀerence in emissions.
Table 1 shows the resulting parameter values for the supply curves and the CO2
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Coal
Natural gas
Oil
Nuclear
Hydro
Wind
Solar

Period 1 supply slope
[e /kWh2 ]
2.4 × 10−13
1.2 × 10−09
1.9 × 10−13
6.7 × 10−13
9.0 × 10−13
2.3 × 10−13
3.0 × 10−12

Period 2 supply slope
[e /kWh2 ]
6.6 × 10−14
6.2 × 10−10
2.7 × 10−13
2.3 × 10−13
7.4 × 10−13
3.8 × 10−13
2.4 × 10−12

CO2 intensity
[t/kWh]
0.91 × 10−03
0.36 × 10−03
0.88 × 10−03
0
0
0
0

Table 1: Technology parameters used for the model calibration to the EU.

intensities of fossil fuel technologies.

4.2

Definition of scenarios

We deﬁne the following scenarios.
No-Policy deﬁnes a scenario with no climate policies; i.e., we simulate the electricity
sector outcomes with a zero CO2 price and without subsidies for renewable energies or
energy eﬃciency. Based on this scenario, we are able to calculate and compare the costs
of policy scenarios as changes in outcomes attributed to these policies.
We examine nine diﬀerent policy scenarios that are related to the propositions on
second-best policies outlined in the previous section. All scenarios include carbon pricing,
while the availability of additional policy instruments varies across scenarios. In each
scenario, we require the policy mix to meet the same emissions target for the power sector
(plus implicitly other ETS sectors). We keep this emissions target constant across all
policy scenarios in order to keep the detrimental impacts (negative welfare eﬀects) of
climate change constant.
CO2 -Price assumes the only available instrument is carbon pricing (i.e., without subsidies for learning, R&D, or energy eﬃciency). It implements the current EU policy. The
CO2 price is adjusted for 2020 and 2030 so that the corresponding emissions reduction in
the electricity and non-electricity sectors accords to the current EU climate policy with a
20% CO2 reduction by 2030 compared to 2005. This means our numerical analysis deals
with the European climate policy implemented today, not with possible more stringent
future policies. This allows us to derive policy recommendations for the current state of
the European economy and policy. We do not impose a 20% renewable share restriction
nor a requirement of a 20% energy eﬃciency improvement, because we will study these
policies endogenously under diﬀerent scenario assumptions. In the following scenarios,
CO2 prices can ﬂoat endogenous while keeping the cumulative emissions target over both
periods constant.
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1st-Best applies the ﬁrst-best choice of the policy instruments, as derived in the algebraic analysis. Unlike the previous theoretical step-by-step analysis, all remaining policy
instruments are re-adjusted simultaneously in the second-best.
No-R&D-Sub applies the second-best choice of the policy instruments without an R&D
subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies.
No-Learn-Sub applies the second-best choice of the policy instruments without output
(learning) subsidies for immature renewable energy technologies.
No-Effic-Sub applies the second-best choice of the policy instruments without any
subsidies for energy eﬃciency improvements.
Feed-in considers the optimal policy combination, but with feed-in tariﬀs instead of
simple output subsidies. Subsidies for R&D and energy eﬃciency are also available in
this scenario. The feed-in tariﬀs are modeled as a combination of output subsidies for
immature renewable energies and a tax on electricity. The tax and subsidy rates are
chosen such that total subsidy payments exactly match total tax revenues. (The results
reported by Tables 2 and 3 in columns 7 to 10 refer to this speciﬁcation.) In this scenario
the subsidies and taxes are restricted to the ﬁrst period, because the implementation in the
second period would be sub-optimal. In alternative robustness checks, we impose a tax on
the overall electricity price, or impose a ﬁxed (guaranteed) electricity price for comparison
(not reported in the numerical results in Table 3). The latter two speciﬁcations come closer
to the policy implementation in European countries. This comparison of diﬀerent setups
allows us to test whether the implementation of feed-in tariﬀs in economic models matters
quantitatively.
Feed-in-No-R&D corresponds to scenario No-R&D-Sub with feed-in tariﬀs instead of
output subsidies. No subsidies for investment in R&D are allowed in this scenario, and
the available policy instruments are chosen such that a second-best situation is achieved.
Feed-in-No-Effic corresponds to scenario No-Effic-Sub with feed-in tariﬀs instead of
output subsidies. No subsidies on investments in energy eﬃciency are allowed, and the
available policy instruments are chosen such that a second-best situation is achieved.
Feed-in-Pure resembles scenario Feed-in, yet without the availability of subsidies for
R&D or energy eﬃciency. Since the policy implementation in EU countries guarantees
future subsidies for the sake of predictability of future revenues, we assume the same
feed-in tariﬀs (tax and subsidy rates) in period 2 ad in period 1.

4.3

Application and summary of the theoretical results

This section applies the previous theoretical outcomes to the European policy scenarios.
Table 2 depicts the results for each scenario, (1) to (10) (see column heads), and each
variable in periods 1 and 2 (see ﬁrst column), and summarizes the theoretical outcomes
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

No-

CO2 -Price

1st-Best

No-R&D-

No-Learn-

No-Effic-

Feed-in

Feed-in-

Feed-in-

Feed-in-

Sub

Sub

Sub

No-R&D

No-Effic

Pure

(1)/(5)

(3)/(6)

(2)/(4)

(7)

(7)/(8)

(7)/(9)

Policy
Propositions
Policy cost wrt CO2 -Price

↓

ref

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

?

Policy cost wrt 1st-Best

↓

↑

ref

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

Share renew 1 [%]

↓

?

ref

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

Share renew 2 [%]

↓

↓

ref

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

Renew outp sub 1

na

na

ref

↓

na

↑ if price elast of

↓

↓

?

?

ref

↓

↑ if price elast of

?

elec demand > 1;
↓ otherwise

elec demand > 1;
↓ otherwise
Renew outp sub 2

na

na

ref=0

↑

na

↑/↓ see above

ref=0

↑

↑/↓ see above

?

Renew R&D sub 1

na

na

ref

na

↑ if outp incr via R&D

↑/↓ see above

ref

na

↑/↓ see above

na

> replacem of learning
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by R&D; ↓ otherwise
Effic sub 1

na

na

ref

↑

↓

na

↓

↑

na

na

Effic sub 2

na

na

ref

↓

↓

na

↓

↓

na

na

Effic sub 1/2

na

na

ref

↓

↓

na

↓

↓

na

na

Elec tax 1

na

na

ref=0

0

0

0

↑

↑

↑

↑

ref

↓

↑/↓ see above

?

na

na

ref=0

0

0

0

ref=0

↑

↑/↓ see above

?

Renew R&D 1

Elec tax 2

↓

↓

ref

↓

↑/↓ see above

↑/↓ see above

ref

↓

↑/↓ see above

↓

Effic 1

↓

↓

ref

↑

↓

↓

ref

↑

↓

↓

Effic 2

↓

↓

ref

↓

↓

↓

ref

↓

↓

↓

Elec price 1

↓

↑

ref

ref

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

Elec price 2

↓

↑

ref

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

CO2 price 1

na

↑

ref

ref

↑

↑

↓

↓

?

↑

CO2 price 2

na

↑

ref

↑

↑

↑

↓

?

?

↑

Table 2: Theoretical results for the EU climate and energy policy scenarios in periods 1 (short-term) and 2 (long-term). ↑ indicates that the corresponding
policy instrument is to be adjusted upwards relative to ref(erence) in the same row in order to improve welfare, ↓ indicates the opposite adjustment to improve
welfare. n a denotes not available. 0 indicates that a zero value is optimal. ? indicates that the direction of the optimal adjustment is ambiguous.

formulated in the previous propositions and explanations. The table highlights in which
direction the various policy instruments need to be adjusted (upwards or downwards)
compared to a reference value in order to elevate welfare, when one policy instrument is
removed. Welfare eﬀects are expressed as policy costs relative to 1st-Best policy costs.
In the table, “Renew R&D sub 1” symbolizes an R&D subsidy for immature renewable
energies that is only available in the ﬁrst period. “Renew R&D” indicates the actual
investment in research and development. If the subsidy for R&D is reduced, we expect
a reduction in R&D as well. “Renew outp sub 1” or “Renew outp sub 2”, respectively,
symbolizes a subsidy for renewable energy output in period 1 (short-term) or period 2
(long-term). “Eﬃc sub 1/2” symbolizes a subsidy for energy eﬃciency investments that
aﬀects both periods. Accordingly, the eﬀect of this subsidy is attributed to both periods.
Changes in electricity and CO2 prices accord with the considerations of Section 3.2.
The scenarios that implement feed-in tariﬀs require further explanation. According
to Proposition 7, the renewable energy output subsidy in the ﬁrst period is lower in
Feed-in Opt than in 1st-Best, because it is accompanied by an electricity tax larger than
zero. Following the argument of Proposition 7, the same is true for scenario Feed-inNo-R&D compared to No-R&D-Sub and for Feed-in-No-Effic compared to No-Effic-Sub.
In scenario Feed-in-No-Effic, however, the ﬁrst-period output subsidy can be re-adjusted
upward or downward depending on the price elasticity of energy demand so that the
overall adjustment of the output subsidy is ambiguous as indicated by the question mark.
Propositions 8 and 9 tell us how to adjust the ﬁrst-period subsidy and electricity tax in
Feed-in-No-R&D and Feed-in-No-Effic compared to Feed-in. The feed-in tariﬀ scenarios
result in higher electricity prices, because the electricity tax comes on top of the prices.
We expect second-period renewable energy shares in total electricity generation to be
lower than in 1st-Best in all other scenarios, because the 1st-Best provides optimal support
for renewable energies, and we do not examine above-optimal second-best policies. The
situation is less clear in period one, because the eﬀects of learning and R&D have not yet
materialized. The numerical model analysis will shed light on such ambiguous aspects.

4.4

Numerical policy analysis

This section describes and interprets the simulation results. It pays special attention to
the propositions derived in the algebraic policy analysis that have been translated into
the qualitative policy results in Table 2. In the theoretical considerations in Section
3.2 we studied the impact of one below-optimal or non-available policy instrument on
each other instrument separately. In the following numerical treatment we are able to
study the impact of one non-available policy instrument on all remaining instruments
simultaneously. This is supposed to reveal possible interactions between the adjustments
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of second-best instruments. Immature renewable energy technologies are represented by
wind and solar power. The section concludes with a critical discussion of the methodology
and the results.
4.4.1

Results

Table 3 depicts the results for each scenario, (1) to (10) (see column heads), and each
variable in periods 1 and 2 (see ﬁrst column). The table mirrors Table 2. (For further
explanations of abbreviations used in the table see Section 4.3). One diﬀerence between
the tables is that (immature) renewable energy technologies (“renew”) are now split into
wind and solar technologies. The electricity mix changes endogenously across scenarios
but is not substantially diﬀerent from the reference mix in scenario CO2 -Price. The CO2
price is ﬁxed in scenario CO2 -Price, whereas it declines endogenously in the other scenarios. Electricity prices, measured in Euros, endogenously determine the electricity market
equilibrium. Wind and solar R&D as well as energy eﬃciency improvements emerge endogenously, too. They are measured in model-speciﬁc “physical” units. Investments in
energy eﬃciency are normalized such that CO2 -Price investments are set to zero. Thus,
investments smaller than in CO2 -Price show up as negative numbers. The investments in
energy eﬃciency denoted by “Eﬃc 1/2” are attributed to both periods. The relative magnitudes of policy instruments are expressed in percentage of 1st-Best implementations.
Since the 1st-Best scenario assumes zero second-period output subsidies, second-period
output subsidies are expressed relative to their ﬁrst-period values. The values in brackets
report the absolute magnitudes of policy instruments in EUR/MWh.
Scenario CO2 -Price with carbon pricing creates a loss, i.e., a policy cost, compared to
No-Policy without any carbon or energy policy based on Equation (20). This cost reﬂects
about 7.5 billion Euros. It serves as our reference and is set to 100%. The policy costs
of the other scenarios are measured in percentage of the CO2 -Price cost. 1st-Best entails
policy costs that are about three quarters of the CO2 -Price cost. The remaining columns
contain the second-best scenarios, which generate smaller cost savings than 1st-Best. The
cost reduction due to leaving out energy eﬃciency subsidies in column (6) is much more
pronounced than the cost saving due to leaving out R&D or output subsidies for immature
renewable energies in columns (4) and (5). This result underlines the important role
of energy eﬃciency improvements and related policies in achieving emissions reductions
eﬀectively. Column (7) reports the results for scenario Feed-in, which adds an electricity
tax to scenario 1st-Best. Due to the economically ineﬃcient tax, the cost saving (not
visible in the table) is slightly smaller than in 1st-Best. The Feed-in-Pure scenario in
column (10) creates even higher policy costs than CO2 -Price. This means the distortion
created by the tax instrument overcompensates the beneﬁt of using the output subsidy,
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which is not present in scenario CO2 -Price. These results suggest that not making use of
feed-in tariﬀs is welfare superior to making use of them. They also suggest that feed-in
tariﬀs are inappropriate instruments for addressing the market failures in the domain of
R&D and in the domain of energy eﬃciency.
The CO2 price declines in scenario 1st-Best, especially in the second period, because
the policy instruments used in this scenario reduce electricity demand and foster wind
and solar power. As a consequence, CO2 emitting electricity generation is dampened.
The second-best scenarios in the subsequent columns are in most cases less eﬀective in
reducing CO2 prices. Scenario Feed-in introduces the tax instrument, which induces an
additional shift of electricity generation from fossil to renewable energies. This is reﬂected
by lower CO2 prices. Note that total emissions generated by the power sector and by the
other emissions trading scheme sectors are constant.
As predicted by Table 2, the second-period renewable energy share (electricity generation from wind and solar power divided by total electricity generation) never exceeds
that of 1st-Best. The ﬁrst-period renewable energy share, on the contrary, exceeds it in
scenarios without energy eﬃciency subsidies. In these scenarios, the higher electricity demand goes along with a higher renewable energy share. This implies that the additional
energy production is biased towards renewable energies.
In the second-best scenarios the remaining policy instruments are re-adjusted so that
welfare is maximized under the restriction of the non-availability of a speciﬁc policy instrument. In accordance with Proposition 1, the ﬁrst-period output subsidies for immature
renewable energy technologies are lower in column (4) No-R&D-Sub than in column (3)
1st-Best. Also in accordance with Proposition 1, the second-period output subsidies for
immature renewable energies are positive and hence higher than in 1st-Best. In accordance with Proposition 5, both energy eﬃciency subsidies aﬀecting the long-term, “Eﬃc
sub short 2” and “Eﬃc sub long 1/2 ” are slightly reduced in column (4) compared to
column (3). Due to the interaction of policy instruments, the adjustment of the shortterm subsidy for energy eﬃciency is more complicated. Proposition 5 predicts a higher
short-term subsidy. Yet Proposition 6 predicts a lower short-term subsidy, because the
renewable output subsidy is lower than in 1st-Best. According to the numerical results,
the latter eﬀect dominates.
When comparing column (5), No-Learn-Sub, with column (3), 1st-Best, the welfare
maximizing second-best choice of the R&D subsidies for wind and solar turns out to be
slightly higher than the ﬁrst-best choice. This accords to Proposition 3, which proposes an
ambiguous outcome. A clearer diﬀerence appears when calculating R&D subsidy payments
per (ﬁrst-period) physical output volume of the corresponding technology (not shown in
the table). Then the R&D subsidy rate per output clearly rises in No-Learn-Sub compared
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

No-

CO2 -Price

1st-Best

No-R&D-

No-Learn-

No-Effic-

Feed-in

Feed-in-

Feed-in-

Feed-in-

Sub

Sub

Sub

No-R&D

No-Effic

Pure

(1)/(5)

(3)/(6)

(2)/(4)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Policy
Proposition
0

100

67.56

68.49

67.59

99.37

67.56

68.55

99.36

100.26

Share renew 1 [%]

Policy costs wrt CO2 -Price [%]

25.42

26.45

26.23

26.23

26.15

26.45

26.25

26.24

26.45

26.60

Share renew 2 [%]

29.34

32.44

32.63

32.48

32.63

32.60

32.63

32.49

32.58

32.57

Wind output sub 1 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.66)

97 (0.63)

0

0

89 (0.59)

87 (0.56)

0

123 (0.82)

Solar output sub 1 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (5.11)

97 (4.93)

0

0

89 (4.55)

87 (4.43)

0

138 (7.07)

Wind output sub 2 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

0

18* (0.12)

0

0

0

18* (0.12)

0

123* (0.82)
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Solar output sub 2 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

0

18* (0.91)

0

0

0

18* (0.92)

0

138* (7.07)

Wind R&D sub 1 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.41)

0

100 (0.41)

80 (0.37)

100 (0.41)

0

75 (0.30)

0

Solar R&D sub 1 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.81)

0

100 (0.82)

80 (0.77)

100 (0.81)

0

75 (0.61)

0

Effic sub short 1 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.12)

99.7 (0.12)

99.2 (0.12)

0

99.9 (0.12)

99.5 (0.12)

0

0

Effic sub short 2 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.45)

99.93 (0.46)

99.8 (0.45)

0

99.5 (0.45)

99.4 (0.46)

0

0

Effic sub long 1/2 [% (EUR/MWh)]

0

0

100 (0.64)

99.93 (0.64)

99.8 (0.64)

0

99.5 (0.64)

99.4 (0.64)

0

0

Elec tax 1 [EUR/MWh]

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.31

0.30

0

0.46

Elec tax 2 [EUR/MWh]

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.10

0

0.76

Wind R&D 1

0

0.01

0.06

0.01

0.06

0.07

0.06

0.01

0.06

0.02

Solar R&D 1

0

0.01

0.04

0

0.04

0.05

0.04

0

0.11

0.01

Effic 1

-1.68

0

3.46

3.48

3.47

-0.03

3.46

3.48

0

-0.02

Effic 2

-4.69

0

5.46

5.56

5.46

-0.11

5.46

5.55

-0.10

-0.02

Elec price 1 [EUR/MWh]

97.69

101.00

94.93

94.91

95.15

101.04

95.08

95.06

101.04

100.90

Elec price 2 [EUR/MWh]

85.28

98.00

86.97

87.24

86.99

97.67

86.97

87.22

97.83

97.95

CO2 price 1 [EUR/t]

0

22.00

20.86

20.86

20.91

22.01

20.83

20.83

22.01

21.89

CO2 price 2 [EUR/t]

0

39.00

29.46

29.70

29.48

38.72

29.46

29.66

38.75

38.30

Table 3: Simulation results for the ten EU climate and energy policy scenarios in periods 1 (short-term) and 2 (long-term). Policy costs are expressed
in percentage of the policy costs of the CO2 -Price scenario with a carbon price only. The relative magnitudes of the policy instruments are expressed in
percentage of 1st-Best. (*Since 1st-Best assumes zero second-period output subsidies, second-period output subsidies are expressed relative to their ﬁrst-period
values.)

to 1st-Best. Based on Proposition 3, we conclude that in our model speciﬁcation and
calibration, the output increase resulting from higher R&D subsidies is larger than the
replacement of learning by R&D. In accordance with Proposition 6, all types of energy
eﬃciency subsidies slightly decrease in the second-best scenario No-Learn-Sub compared
to 1st-Best.
In column (6), No-Effic-Sub, the ﬁrst-period output subsidies drop to zero,3 and the
R&D subsidies are reduced to 80% of the 1st-Best values. Referring to Proposition 2 and
Proposition 4, this implies that the price elasticity of electricity demand is below unity in
our model speciﬁcation and calibration. As a consequence, the reduction of electricity from
renewable energies translates into lower electricity demand. The reduction of electricity
from renewable energies leads to a more than proportional increase in the electricity price,
which in turn incentivizes higher investments in energy eﬃciency. Nonetheless, the nonavailability of energy eﬃciency subsidies results in a strong reduction in energy eﬃciency
investments as indicated by the negative numbers.
Column (7) reports scenario Feed-in, which adds an electricity tax to scenario 1stBest. As a result, the output subsidy rates are lower than in 1st-Best in accordance
with Proposition 7. Column (8) reports Feed-in-No-R&D, where no R&D subsidies for
renewable energies are allowed. Similarly to Proposition 1, the resulting second-best
optimal renewable energy output subsidies are lower in the ﬁrst period and higher in the
second period than in Feed-in. Furthermore, the subsidy rates are lower than in No-R&DSub as predicted by Proposition 7. The corresponding electricity taxes are adjusted in the
same direction as the subsidies. The energy eﬃciency subsidies are adjusted downwards
as expected.
Column (9) depicts scenario Feed-in-No-Effic, where no energy eﬃciency subsidies are
allowed. Since the price elasticity of electricity demand is below unity as argued above,
the renewable energy output subsidies for both periods as well as the R&D subsidies are
adjusted downwards compared to Feed-in. As expected, the R&D subsidy rates in Feedin-No-Effic are lower than in No-Effic-Sub, because the subsidies are accompanied by
taxes.4 Column (10), Feed-in-Pure deals with feed-in tariﬀs as practically implemented
in Europe, in particular in Germany. This implementation excludes R&D and energy
eﬃciency subsidies.5 The output subsidy and tax rates exceed those of the 1st-Best
scenario.
3
In this case the model generates a strong effect by finding a corner solution for the output subsidies.
A possible reason is that the output subsidies’ potential for reducing energy supply and demand is by far
smaller than the potential of the energy efficiency subsidies that they replace.
4
The model generates zero second-best output subsidy rates.
5
We leave out R&D subsidies as well as energy efficiency subsidies in order to match the analysis with
typical European feed-in tariff systems such as the German system.
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Due to overlapping policy eﬀects, the pattern of CO2 and electricity prices is less clear
than in the theoretical step-by-step analysis.
4.4.2

Discussion

This section critically discusses our results and positions them within the literature.
The policy eﬀects generated by our numerical model application to the EU, summarized in Table 3, overall corroborate and illustrate our general theoretical ﬁndings,
summarized in Table 2. This congruence shows that possible interdependencies between
the re-adjustments of diﬀerent second-best instruments are negligible. Otherwise, the
numerical results, which take all interdependencies into account, would deviate from the
step-wise theoretical results in Section 3.2.
The diﬀerences in the numerical results across scenarios are small in several cases.
Thus, taking the results at face value, the error value of not re-adjusting single policy
instruments in second-best situations is small, given the current situation of the European
power sector and today’s policies.
This

result

diﬀers

from

that

of

Böhringer and Rosendahl

(2010)

and

Boeters and Koornneef (2011) who ﬁnd substantial welfare losses caused by overlapping policy instruments. The reason is that our analysis rules out the possibility of
adverse distortive eﬀects created by exogenously given overlapping policy constraints
such as the 20% renewable energy target. Such constraints would undermine our study
of second-best optimal policy scenarios.
Furthermore, we build our analysis on a baseline scenario, which includes moderate
climate and policy targets that are in practice or decided today. Consequently, our results
provide conservative advice for current policy implementations. Notably, we have carried
out a robustness check with a more stringent CO2 emissions reduction of 30% by 2030
compared to 1990 instead of 20% by 2030 compared to 2005. The results, however, hardly
diﬀer, especially when referring to welfare eﬀects in relative terms. Possible more ambitious future emissions targets as proposed by the European Roadmap to 2050 (EU-COM,
2011) will likely increase the long-term magnitude of the estimated policy eﬀects. Likewise, the beneﬁts of supporting knowledge creation in the renewable energy sector via
R&D and learning subsidies can become more pronounced over a longer time horizon.
This is particularly true when taking the appearance of novel breakthrough technologies
into account.
Higher values of the slope parameters that inﬂuence the adjustment of electricity
generation from diﬀerent technologies would also increase the magnitude of the policy
eﬀects. However, as in the analyses by FN and FNP, it is not the main purpose of our
simulations to deliver precise quantiﬁcations, but to illustrate and validate our theoretical
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ﬁndings. Notwithstanding, we test the impact of diﬀerent key parameter values in a
sensitivity analysis. The parameter ρ governs the strength of knowledge spillovers. Its
impact turns out to be relatively small. We also vary the magnitude of the feed-in tariﬀ
rates in both periods without ﬁnding a clear-cut qualitative change in the results. Overall,
the order of magnitude of the eﬀects that we ﬁnd for the EU is similar to the order of
magnitude that FN and FNP ﬁnd for the USA.
In another robustness check, we ﬁnd that the economic distortion that feed-in tariﬀs
create is small and very similar across different implementations in the model. We implement them as a combination of ﬁxed renewable energy subsidies and fossil fuel taxes
(Kalkuhl et al., 2013), or a combination of ﬁxed renewable energy subsidies and a general
tax on electricity, or a combination of a guaranteed electricity price payment and a general
tax on electricity as in practice in Germany.
In accordance with FNP’s ﬁnding for renewable performance standards and in contrast
to Kalkuhl et al. (2012) and Kalkuhl et al. (2013), our results are critical with respect
to feed-in tariﬀs as a substitute for ﬁrst-best instruments. In particular, we ﬁnd that
energy eﬃciency improvements and related policies are crucial for eﬃciently achieving
an emissions target. Energy eﬃciency improvements can hardly be replaced by other
policy measures on the electricity supply side. But also within the domain of renewable
energies, R&D-related policies cannot be eﬃciently replaced by output-related policies
such as output subsidies or feed-in tariﬀs.
Although the numerical diﬀerences between the policy scenarios are in some cases
small, the ﬁrst-best policy reduces the European baseline cost burden imposed by the
emissions target by about one third compared to carbon pricing as the sole instrument.
In practice, the magnitudes estimated for the EU will diﬀer across European countries,
for example, depending on the country-speciﬁc potential of renewable energy sources.

5

Conclusion

We have studied the interaction of output (learning) and R&D subsidies for immature
renewable energy-based power generation as well as subsidies for improving energy eﬃciency in the presence of carbon pricing. Our considerations and results should be helpful
for policy makers who would like to know how they should re-adjust policy instruments in
order to elevate welfare if a speciﬁc instrument is not (suﬃciently) available for practical
or political reasons.
According to our conservative numerical results, the policy cost of the European carbon
emissions target, currently implemented in the EU ETS, has an order of magnitude of
about 7.5 billion Euros. The EU ETS, however, creates an important environmental
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beneﬁt that is not included in our analysis. Accordingly, the real “bird in the hand”
is the EU ETS. The estimated welfare gains from the ﬁne-tuning of single second-best
instruments are in some cases small. Nonetheless, the joint re-adjustment of all policy
instruments can reduce the current cost burden of the European climate and energy policy
by up to one third or 2.5 billion Euros compared to a scenario with carbon pricing as the
only instrument. Energy eﬃciency improvements contribute the largest cost reduction.
For policy makers who strive for these “birds in the bush,” our analysis provides the recipe
to catch them.
To this end, we have theoretically derived detailed recommendations for the secondbest re-adjustment of policy instruments. Additionally, we have studied to what extend
feed-in tariﬀs can replace these instruments. We have modeled feed-in tariﬀs by combining
the output subsidy for immature renewable energy technologies with a tax on electricity
or the output of the remaining technologies. In this combined form, the output subsidy
needs to be reduced compared to its use as a single instrument in order to improve
welfare, because the tax does part of the job of the subsidy. Our results suggest that
feed-in tariﬀs, as currently implemented in several European countries, are inappropriate
instruments for addressing the market failures in the domain of R&D spillovers and in
the domain of energy eﬃciency improvements. Nonetheless, the economic distortion that
is created by a feed-in tariﬀ is small. In this sense, feed-in tariﬀs are good substitutes for
pure renewable energy output subsidies. The advantage of feed-in tariﬀs compared to pure
subsidies is that cost neutrality is guaranteed such that the tax on electricity ﬁnances the
subsidy for renewable energy technologies. The guaranteed future electricity prices also
create certainty in income streams of investors. If investors are risk averse, this will lead
to more R&D and learning. Yet subsidies that directly support R&D and investments in
energy eﬃciency are more eﬃcient than feed-in tariﬀs. Our results in particular suggest
better investment incentives in the domain of energy eﬃciency.
Taking the discussed caveats into account, we hope that our analysis provides useful
guidance for climate and energy policy design. Future research could model feed-in tariﬀs in speciﬁc European countries and assume more ambitious long-term climate policy
targets. Today, however, more ambitious targets are still debated.
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and Victoria Alexeeva-Talebi for making this project possible. We thank Svenja Höﬂer
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Supplementary Appendix

(aa) Proof of Proposition 1:
Output subsidies cannot directly aﬀect knowledge creation, but they can indirectly
induce it by inﬂuencing the volume of electricity generation. We know from Equation
(21) that in the presence of R&D spillovers any intervention Ψ that increases knowledge
hi1 elevates welfare W . We know from (10) that the R&D investments are below the social
optimum if σ is smaller than (1 − ρ). Furthermore, a below-optimal R&D subsidy results
in below-optimal second-period output q i2 . We know from (3) that Chi2i1 qi2 < 0 so that
the left-hand side of (10) becomes below-optimal. Hence, overall we need to augment the
left hand side of (10) to come closer to the socially optimal subsidy rate. We know from
(3) that Chi2i1 < 0, Chi2i1 qi1 > 0 and Chi2i1 qi2 < 0. This means policy makers need to decrease
the subsidy for immature renewable energy output φi1 , ∀ i ∈ r in the short-term, i.e.,
period 1, but increase the subsidy for immature renewable energy output φi2 , ∀ i ∈ r in
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the long-term, i.e., period 2, in order to raise the magnitude of the cost reduction eﬀect
of knowledge, represented by Chi2i1 .6 
This ﬁnding requires further explanation and leaves room for discussion. The augmentation of the second-period subsidy appears straightforward and unambiguous: When
more electricity is to be produced in the future, then any reduction of future costs will
aﬀect a larger generated quantity in the future and thus increase the beneﬁts of today’s
R&D. The cutback of the short-term subsidy surprises: One might think that a higher
output subsidy has to compensate for the shortfall of the R&D subsidy. However, the full
beneﬁt of learning-by-doing has already been exploited by the ﬁrst-best output subsidy.
A further increase of learning-by-doing would crowd out R&D investments. Yet, we aim
at the enhancement of knowledge creation via R&D investment. One might argue, higher
production enhances R&D in a complementary way. Though, the following consideration
suggests the opposite: Suppose an initially immature technology has made tremendous
progress in terms of cost reductions over time. The potential for further cost reductions
through R&D for the same technology will be limited. Less technical progress through
learning, on the contrary, leaves more room for cost reductions through R&D and hence
creates an additional incentive for R&D investment. Following this argument, we assume
R&D and learning act as substitutes. The interdependence of the R&D-related and the
learning-related policy instruments will work in opposite directions, if one assumes that
R&D and learning act as complements. (For a further discussion see FN.)
We refer to cost reductions within a given set of technologies in our analysis. We
abstain from taking into account that research can create new (breakthrough) technologies.
Thus, R&D with the aim to create new technologies is hardly aﬀected by learning, and
it is likely economically reasonable to support this kind of research even more when the
potential of technical progress has been exploited for the existing technologies. This
means the reduction of the short-term output subsidy in the second-best hinges upon the
assumption that technical progress reduces the production costs of existing technologies.
The result would likely be reversed if the creation of new technologies were taken into
account.
Regarding the interaction of climate and energy policies, the question of how
unavailable or inadequate R&D subsidies for immature renewable energies aﬀect the
6

Conversely, a higher output subsidy in the short-term would also expand output in the long-term
via learning. This effect counteracts the incentive to reduce the first-period subsidy. Nevertheless, when
the second-period output subsidy is available, one can induce higher second-period output via a higher
second-period subsidy and reduce the first-period subsidy. If the second-period subsidy is not available, it
is not evident whether the first-period subsidy should be de- or increased due to the two opposite effects.
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electricity and the CO2 price is of importance for policy makers. The long-term eﬀect
is straightforward:

Less R&D in carbon-free technologies leads to higher produc-

tion costs of these technologies, according to (3) and (10), and thus less carbon-free
electricity generation q i2 , i ∈ r.

Hence, the output of other technologies including

fossil-based technologies must rise in order to satisfy electricity demand. As a result,
the electricity and the carbon price for the second period will increase when emissions are curbed by a given emissions cap.

The short-term impact within the ﬁrst

period is zero, because the eﬀect of R&D is not realized before the second period and
the burden on public ﬁnance does not aﬀect the behavior of economic agents in the model.

(ab) Proof of Proposition 2:
We know from Equation (21) that in the presence of undervaluation of the representative consumer’s true beneﬁt of energy eﬃciency improvements, any increase in energy
eﬃciency measures will raise welfare. We know from Equations (13), (14) and (15) that
the left hand side of each equation will be too low from a social point of view if each λ is
too low or zero. Hence, we need to augment the left hand side of each equation to come
closer to the social optimum. The way to achieve this is to enlarge the marginal value
of electricity demand reduction through investment in energy eﬃciency, signiﬁed by pt dtet
and the three types of et . Basically, this requires an increase in the electricity volume
times the electricity price. On the one hand, each output subsidy φit extends electricity
output q it in the same period. Additionally, φi1 extends future output q i2 via learning.
We know from (7) that electricity demand equals electricity supply in equilibrium. Furthermore, Equation (6) tells us that the magnitude of the marginal reduction of electricity
demand through energy eﬃciency measures will become higher when the consumption of
energy services is higher, i.e., dtet vt < 0. We know implicitly that the consumption of
energy services and energy demand are positively linked since dtvt > 0 and hence vdt t > 0.
Therefore, higher output subsidies φit for immature renewable energy technologies (with
an additional learning eﬀect) in particular and for any electricity generation technologies
(without an additional learning eﬀect, but causing an output expansion in the same period) in both periods are the preferable choice with respect to welfare maximization. On
the other hand, the subsidy and the increased electricity supply reduce the electricity price
pt . This consideration, on the contrary, suggests lower (or for the second period negative)
electricity output subsidies. The overall eﬀect on the marginal value of demand reduction
depends on whether the price or the quantity sensitivity is stronger. A price elasticity of
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electricity demand above unity implies that electricity quantities react more sensitively
than prices. 
Note that any subsidy or tax creates a transfer that is welfare neutral in the model.
We assume that this transfer does not aﬀect the consumer’s calculus via a change in her
budget. If this were taken into account, a higher subsidy would reduce the consumer’s
disposable income budget. This would in turn reduce her demand for electricity and hence
the electricity price.
Regarding the interaction of climate and energy policy, the key question is how the
lack of subsidies for energy eﬃciency investment aﬀects the electricity and CO2 price.
It is apparent that less investment in energy eﬃciency increases electricity demand and
hence electricity generation, as formally described by Equations (4), (7) and (13) to (15).
This creates upward pressure on the electricity price in the corresponding period; since
the electricity mix includes fossil energy, the use of fossil fuels will rise and drive up the
CO2 price for a given emissions cap.

(ba) Proof of Proposition 3:
This examination partly mirrors the examination of the output subsidy in the absence
of the R&D subsidy in (aa). Yet there are two diﬀerences: First, producers’ choice of
output also depends on the electricity price pt , whereas there is no explicit market price
for knowledge. Second, unlike the output subsidy, the R&D subsidy is only available for
the ﬁrst period. (A second-period R&D subsidy is not reasonable, because it would aﬀect
a third model period, which is not taken into account.) We know from Equation (21)
that in the presence of learning spillovers any intervention Ψ that increases output q i1
of immature renewable energy technologies will elevate welfare W . We know from (8)
that the left hand side will be too low from a social point of view if φ is too low or zero.
For the right hand side of (8), (3) says that low marginal production costs are associated
with limited production q i1 . Hence, we need to augment the left hand side of (8) to come
closer to the social optimum. Now there are two opposing eﬀects. We know from (3) that
Cqi2i1 qi2 < 0, i.e., the magnitude of the marginal cost reduction through learning from the
point of view of the ﬁrst period will increase when there is more electricity production
in the second period. This consideration suggests choosing a higher R&D subsidy in
order to enhance the value of learning from ﬁrst-period production. By contrast, the
negative interdependence between learning and R&D as discussed in detail in (aa) and
expressed by Chi2i1 qi1 > 0 in (3) implies that we require a lower R&D subsidy in order to
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leave more room for cost reductions via learning. Additionally, according to (8), ﬁrstperiod output implicitly increases in the ﬁrst-period electricity price, because a higher
p1 on the left-hand side of (8) lowers the marginal eﬀect Cqi2i1 < 0, which ceteris paribus
requires a larger q i1 . Furthermore, a higher second-period electricity price requires a lower
ﬁrst-period R&D subsidy so that the resulting cost reduction and second-period output
expansion are smaller. 
Regarding the interaction of climate and energy policy, a relevant question is how
the non-availability of the output (learning) subsidy for immature renewable energies
aﬀects the CO2 price. The long-term eﬀect is again straightforward. The diﬀerence with
the non-availability of the R&D subsidy is that the output subsidy aﬀects electricity
generation of immature renewables in both periods, as can be seen in (8). Hence, in
the short- and long-term, a lower subsidy for carbon-free technologies results in higher
production costs of these technologies, according to (3) and (8), and hence less carbon-free
output q i1 , q i2 , i ∈ r. The output of other electricity generation technologies including
fossil-based technologies must rise in order to satisfy electricity demand. As a result, the
electricity and the carbon price will increase in both periods when emissions are curbed
by a given emissions cap.

(bb) Proof of Proposition 4:
This policy experiment mimics (ab), albeit with a notable diﬀerence: The ﬁrst-period
output subsidy augments the output of the ﬁrst and second period, and a second-period
subsidy the output of the second period. The R&D subsidy is granted in the ﬁrst period,
but aﬀects output in the second period only. Neglecting income eﬀects of transfers to
producers, the R&D subsidy is unaﬀected by the unavailability of the short-term, i.e.,
ﬁrst-period, energy eﬃciency subsidy λS1 . The reason is that today’s R&D decisions focus
on the long-term situation when the fruits of R&D have become apparent. Therefore,
the R&D subsidy is aﬀected by the energy eﬃciency subsidies that aﬀect the long-term,
i.e., λS2 and λL1 . As in (ab), higher energy eﬃciency investments can be induced by
increasing the marginal value of electricity demand reduction, expressed by pt dtet in
(14) and (15). As a consequence, the overall eﬀect on the marginal value of demand
reduction depends on whether the price or the quantity sensitivity is stronger, as in (ab).
A price elasticity of electricity demand above unity implies that electricity quantities
react more sensitively than prices. Hence, given an elasticity above unity, one will aim
at a larger electricity quantity in order to induce higher investments in energy eﬃciency. 
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(ca) Proof of Proposition 5:
Energy eﬃciency investments cannot directly aﬀect knowledge creation, but they can
aﬀect it indirectly by inﬂuencing the volume of electricity generation. We know from
Equation (21) that in the presence of R&D spillovers any intervention Ψ that increases
knowledge hi1 will elevate welfare W . Equations (13) to (15) state that the left hand
side will be too low from a social point of view if λ is too low or zero. For the right hand
side, we know from (4) that the resulting low marginal energy eﬃciency expenditures are
associated with limited energy eﬃciency improvements ei1 . Hence, we need to augment
the left hand side of (10) to come closer to the social optimum. The following argument
is similar to the reasoning in (aa) and (ab). We know from (3) that Chi2i1 qi1 > 0 and
Chi2i1 qi2 < 0. This means policy makers need to decrease immature renewable energy
output in the short-term, i.e., period 1, and increase it in the long-term, i.e., period 2,
in order to raise the magnitude of the cost reduction eﬀect of knowledge, represented
by Chi2i1 . More knowledge creation in the short-term will create higher output in the
long-term since Chi2i1 < 0. According to (7), lower electricity supply translates into lower
demand and vice versa in the market equilibrium. The means to decrease electricity
demand and hence supply in period 1 is a higher energy eﬃciency subsidy for the ﬁrst
period. The means to increase demand and hence supply in period 2 is consequently a
lower energy eﬃciency subsidy for the second period. 

(cb) Proof of Proposition 6:
The argument mimics that of (ca) above with a notable diﬀerence: Equation (21)
states that in the presence of learning spillovers any intervention Ψ that increases output
q i1 of immature renewable energy technologies will elevate welfare W . Now changes
in energy eﬃciency imply changes in electricity demand via (4), which directly aﬀects
electricity supply via (7). As a consequence, policy makers can directly augment electricity output by reducing energy eﬃciency subsidies for the short- and long-term, which
lowers the consumer’s investments in energy eﬃciency and raises her electricity demand. 

(da) Proof of Proposition 8:
The feed-in tariﬀ rate refers to the choice of the policy levels as described by Equations
(8) and (9). The reasoning is equivalent to that of Proposition 1. Now we compare the
situation with a feed-in tariﬀ (including renewable energy output subsidies) and energy
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eﬃciency subsidies, but without R&D subsidies, to a situation with a feed-in tariﬀ and
energy eﬃciency subsidies and R&D subsidies as well. The proposition explains how to
adjust the feed-in tariﬀ when R&D subsidies are not available (for political reasons).
Proposition 7 holds as well. 

(db) Proof of Proposition 9:
The argument mimics that of Proposition 2 at ﬁrst glance. Now we compare the situation with a ﬁrst-period feed-in tariﬀ (including renewable energy output subsidies) and
an R&D subsidy but without energy eﬃciency subsidies to a situation with a ﬁrst-period
feed-in tariﬀ and an R&D subsidy and with energy eﬃciency subsidies. The proposition
explains how to adjust the feed-in tariﬀ when energy eﬃciency subsidies are not (suﬃciently) available (for political reasons). At second glance, we need to take the eﬀect of
the tax on total electricity generation into account. The subsidy for immature renewable energies enhances electricity output, whereas the tax on the remaining technologies
abates electricity output. Furthermore, the tax creates an additional distortion. On the
contrary, the optimal output subsidy will, according to Proposition 7, be reduced, once a
tax is added. This reduces the subsidy-induced distortion. In this sense, the tax opposes
the subsidy. This also holds for the eﬀect of the tax and the subsidy for the electricity
price as outlined under Proposition 2. The overall eﬀect depends on whether the subsidy
or the tax dominates the overall reaction of electricity generation and pricing. Notwithstanding, one can expect that the eﬀect of the subsidy dominates. The reason is that the
subsidy is granted for renewable energy technologies with learning potential. Besides the
direct output expansion, the subsidy therefore fosters learning (see Equation 8). On the
contrary, the eﬀect of the tax does not involve learning, nor other externalities, and is
hence weaker. We end up with a result that mimics Proposition 2. 
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